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Abstract—This paper discusses how born-digital cultural ma-
terial can be opened up for research. We focus in particular
on the grey area between private mobile phone data and its
publication and use for research and beyond. We report on
the results of the ’Empowering Data Citizens’ (EDC) project,
which is a collaboration between King’s College London and the
Open Data Institute. The work builds on the project Our Data
Ourselves (http://big-social-data.net/), which studies the content
we generate on our mobile devices, what we call big social data
(BSD), and explores the possibilities of its ethical storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our project addresses a basic research question: How do
we transform BSD into open data, and in turn, empower the
end users of mobile devices and cultivate new data communi-
ties? There are basic contradictions here that necessitate our
cultural-technological approach. On the one hand, (meta)data
is private data, digital traces identifying who, what, where
and when. This is data already deeply embedded in digital
enterprises and the security state as a source of both economic
value and surveillance. Yet, it remains largely out of the hands
of the everyday use of those who produce it. On the other
hand, metadata is more than just a source of economic value
or surveillance; it reveals a surprising breadth and depth of
cultural activities. In identifying the who, what, where and
when, these digital traces offer innovative approaches to the
core of arts and humanities research.
Once understood as mere machine-to-machine data because
it is composed of communication between a device and a cell
tower, GPS satellite, application, and so on, standard mobile
phone metadata can provide nuanced insight into cultural
life, as NSA/GCHQ revelations show. We identify both an
emerging cultural phenomenon and a technological challenge.
The cultural phenomenon is the effortless and ubiquitous
production of metadata that is increasingly able to provide
intimate details of social and cultural life. The technological
challenge is in transforming that machine-to-machine data
into interoperable open data, but in a manner that safeguards
privacy and facilitates research.
Consequently, our aims and objectives are to research the
implications of opening cultural data, investigating new data
cultures and develop tools and apps for their cultivation.
II. BACKGROUND
The work we report upon has contributed to our existing
work twofold. First, we have developed an open linked data
framework to effectively embed anonymised born digital cul-
tural data. Our technological research has developed proof-
of-concept demonstrators that investigate the use of advanced
anonymisation technologies for publishing cultural data. This
approach will cultivate open data cultures, for example, by
presenting the potential surplus from integrating it with other
linked data resources such as the concept ecosystem of DB-
pedia [1].
The main vector of our research is in approaching born-
digital cultural content via the model of open data. Open data
refers to data available for anyone to use for any purpose
and free of cost. Open data should be in formats that are
interoperable, that is, it can be linked, and thus easily shared,
in a standard and structured format for easy reuse. The key
deliverable of our project is the cultivation of an ethical
environment of openness for this kind of important born-digital
content for cultural analysis.
To this end, we ﬁrst need to address what seems to be
mainly a technical problem, namely the necessary anonymi-
sation to safeguard privacy. Yet, there is a cultural imperative
if it is to function as open data which necessitates it being
rendered functional and interoperable with other open datasets.
Finally, there is a need for it to be open to researchers for
critical inquiry. This requires us to develop an ethical and
dynamic environment of information sharing via our techno-
cultural interdisciplinary approach. In turn, this will facilitate
on-going and innovative research into the dataﬁcation of all
human conditions. While there has been extensive research
into anonymisation techniques and open data in a range of
other academic disciplines from health-care to social sciences,
this research closes this gap for arts and humanities research
on contemporary born-digital material. There is very little
research to our knowledge in the ﬁeld of anynomisation of
cultural data. Where there is existing work, it mainly relates to
heritage data sets, rather than born-digital material, or related
to social science repositories.
In summary, then, our aims and objectives are as follows:
1) Understand the conditions of possibility of opening
BSD and developing a road map for future research
on open BSD
2) Experiment with technologies and methodologies to
facilitate research on this new born-digital material
and explore open data cultures
3) Theorise the changing conditions of open data culture
and thus empower data citizens
III. THE ORIGINAL MOBILEMINER APPLICATION
The Our Data Ourselves project has engaged young coders
in the co-research and development of innovative analytical
tools and methods to expand this new area of cultural research.
The EDC project will develop proof-of-concept demonstrators
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that investigate the use of advanced anonymisation technolo-
gies for publishing cultural data. Anonymisation, however, can
only be the ﬁrst step. The second one has to be the investi-
gation into what cultural research can still do with such an
anonymised resource. If the fundamental humanistic question
is why something happened, this why enquiry will generally
based on the who, where and/or when. These are, however,
exactly the kind of attribute that computerized and manual
anonymisation techniques target. We need to exactly map out
what is left for the scholarly discourse if we cannot make
these kinds of links. Therefore, we will develop a framework
for open linked data to effectively embed anonymised born
digital cultural material.
Previously, we have discussed the development of our
“MobileMiner” application for Android smartphones [2]. This
was in response to our question as to whether the data trails
produced by other phone applications could be collected into
a ”social data commons” while still respecting users’ privacy.
The application was installed on smartphones given to twenty
young coders from Young Rewired State [3], who we regarded
as collaborators. Even if full access to the network trafﬁc of a
device were desirable, it would require root or administrative
privileges. This would be a signiﬁcant barrier to any future
large-scale adoption of the application, and encouraging users
to root their devices could leave them vulnerable to malware.
Software that exploits vulnerabilities to grant users root access
has been shown to be similar to some examples of malware.
It is plausible that some apps that claim to grant root access
altruistically have malicious payloads [4].
We were able to track when other apps opened or closed
network sockets on Android devices by polling the /proc di-
rectory of the underlying Linux ﬁlesystem. This also provided
the TCP port of the socket, mostly of interest in determing
how frequently secure HTTPS trafﬁc on port 443 was used.
The Android API provides a log of network usage on a per-app
basis, and this was also polled. Finally, the application requests
that the user authorizes it as an accessibility service, which
gives it access to notiﬁcations sent by others. A legitimate
accessibility service might render notiﬁcations in large print
or read them out. Only the times of the notiﬁcations and the
applications that sent them were logged, the text they contained
could include parts of emails or other private communications,
and were deemed too invasive to collect. The interpretation of
this data is highly dependent on the application that generated
it. As we have seen previously with mobile games, [2] socket
usage can be a reasonable proxy for a user’s interaction with an
application, but some make contact with servers so frequently
that they tell us nothing about the user.
Although these methods track the activity of mobile appli-
cations, they provide no information about what is transmitted
or received. It is possible to reason about this given the
permissions an application requests. Information about location
via GPS and mobile and wireless networks is of particular
interest, but no way to determine when and where this has been
accessed has been found for a standard non-rooted device. To
illustrate what location data allows applications to learn about
the lives of users, MobileMiner also logs the IDs of mobile
cell towers and wireless networks that devices connect to. The
networks that are merely visible but with no connection are not
logged, neither are GPS or Google’s location APIs used; they
were deemed too invasive. The cell tower IDs were converted
into approximate locations using the OpenCellID database [5].
This often provides a reasonable degree of obfuscation, such
that only a user’s very general habits are disclosed, but in some
cases speciﬁc places of work or study could be identiﬁed.
The SSIDs of wireless networks often contained the names
of institutions that provided them, revealing information about
users more explicitly.
Users are able to start and stop the recording of data at
any time. In the ﬁrst iteration of the application, new data is
uploaded to a CKAN server [6] via a custom plug-in every
ten minutes while the user’s device has a wireless internet
connection. The application gives the option of copying its
internal SQLite database to an area of the device’s internal
storage accessible when it is mounted as a mass-storage device
so that users can access the data they generate. So far, access
to the CKAN database has been granted very selectively on
an individual basis. We have held a hack-day for users of the
application [7] where a virtual machine image of the CKAN
server and its data was shared as a Docker container. Data
was manipulated and displayed by providing a browser-based
Ipython notebook with the MatPlotLib library installed within
the virtual machine.
IV. ENRICHING MOBILEMINER WITH OPENPDS
The MobileMiner application is conservative in the data it
collects. This is in sharp contrast to the Funf Open Sensing
Framework for Android, developed in part by the MIT Media
Lab [8]. This provides a set of “probes” that captures a wide
range of data, and the means for its short-term storage and
eventual dissemination to an external server. Probes include
periodic capture of the IDs of nearby Bluetooth devices, full
GPS location, and mobile web-browser history, far beyond the
remit of MobileMiner to examine the behavior of applications
rather than that of users. Rather than collect only data with a
low risk of identifying the user, the Open Personal Data Store
(OpenPDS) architecture was proposed by the MIT Human
Dynamics group [9] to enable the querying richer data without
betraying users’ privacy.
We have adapted the MobileMiner app to provide the op-
tion of gathering data via the Funf framework and transmitting
it to an OpenPDS instance. Custom Funf probes that call the
pre-existing code that polls network sockets and trafﬁc usage
API were implemented. The decision that MobileMiner should
only log active connections to cell towers and wireless net-
works, rather than periodically scan for available ones requires
the development of other custom Funf probes, rather than the
use of existing ones that capture this data. An overview of
the ﬂow of data is given in ﬁgure 1. MobileMiner uses a
custom Funf pipeline conﬁgured to transmit data to a Personal
Data Store (PDS) using the OpenPDSClient Android library.
Access to a PDS is mediated by a registry server, we have
made Docker images available so that both pieces of software
can be deployed for experimentation and testing very easily.
The intention is that third parties authorized by the owner of
the PDS query the data by submitting questions to it such that
only summarized answers are returned, rather than the raw
data. This is achieved by submitting third-party Python code
to the PDS which is executed using the Celery task scheduler.
The potential for submitting malicious code that betrays the
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Fig. 1. Data workﬂow for MobileMiner and OpenPDS.
privacy principles of OpenPDS or otherwise undermines the
security of the machine on which it is hosted has yet to be fully
explored. A restriction of the modules from the Python stan-
dard library that such questions are allowed to import would
be a good starting-point. The Python runtime environment of
Google’s “App Engine” cloud computing service provides a
modiﬁed version of the “os” module that restricts access to the
underlying operating system. Python’s abilitity to manipulate
the byte-code to which it compiles could also be exploited
[10]. At present, the registry server software speciﬁes a hard-
coded location for the PDS server in its conﬁguration ﬁle.
Clearly, OpenPDS is some way from a safe mass-deployment
by consumers on, for instance, smart TVs, home media servers
or popular low-power devices such as the Raspberry Pi, and
we consider its use as experimental.
V. PRIVACY CHALLENGES
The project is on-going and will conclude in October 2015.
The core research interest of EDC is to explore the boundary
between personal and open data. Subsequently, the project
aims to identify workable solutions which enable individuals to
execute greater agency over their data when handling, trading,
and releasing it. Whether individuals will adopt such tools
will likely depend on effective and credible means for privacy
protection. Preparing such data for a publication through a
structured end-to-end process which enables data citizens to
manage the data through its entire life cycle and protects
privacy is a particularly complex issue.
In the EDC workﬂow model, data ﬂows from individuals
via the MobileMiner app on their smartphones to a database,
which third parties query-based access to the data. From
there, data aggregators can also query data to create open
datasets. The privacy challenges of this model are, at least,
twofold. Firstly, from an individuals perspective, it makes
it much harder to deﬁne acceptable privacy boundaries. As
Helen Nissenbaum [11] argues, individuals chose what they
want to reveal dependent on context. Hence, publishing micro-
data, to an undeﬁned audience with undeﬁned capabilities
and for undeﬁned purposes requires a robust and credible
privacy protection framework handled through human or tech-
nical intermediaries. Secondly, even for such a governance
approach, the unknown data users and their unknown technical
capabilities are a signiﬁcant problem. The core issue here is
that with openly shared data, the data users cannot be known
ex ante and cannot be controlled. Consequently, common
ethical and normative standards for privacy protection are
hard to deﬁne and probably not enforceable. Additionally, it
is unclear which technical capabilities the audience of data
users has; which data resources they can use to produce more
privacy-harming linked data with a higher degree of unicity
or which capabilities they have to reverse-engineer applied
anonymisation techniques. Like many other smartphone apps,
the MobileMiner app collects a number of microdata, such as
location data, data on the use of mobile phones and speciﬁc
apps installed. Hence, to what extent the speciﬁc data collected
by the app can be used to re-store privacy invasive information
both only from the data itself and in combination with outside
information is a core question for EDC.
Enabling wider sharing of data ﬁrst requires an assessment
of how the data collected by MobileMiner might cause privacy
risks. The core issue here is that data generated by the
MobileMiner app, much like any other data produced by
smartphone apps, potentially represents a set of micro data
with a high dimensionality and sparsity. Hence, preparing
such data for a publication is a difﬁcult task, if privacy is
to be protected. Therefore a detailed privacy risk assessment
was conducted on all data which is currently collected by
MobileMiner. The objectives were to assess the entire body of
data collected by MobileMiner, evaluate whether and to what
extent the data impacts privacy, and suggest solutions for risk
mitigation where appropriate.
Overall, it appears that the data collected by MobileMiner
is mostly non-sensitive and broadly relatively unproblematic.
The most novel data classes collected, network socket and
trafﬁc usage, are particularly innocuous, with little chance of
betraying the identity of users. MobileMiner mostly follows a
conservative data collection approach. This limits the necessity
for additional actions to reduce privacy impacts. We should
however add, that this assessment is made under two assump-
tions: The ﬁrst one is that users are sufﬁciently informed when
they decide about any transfer of MobileMiner. As described
in the end-to-end data workﬂow, this should be achieved by a
thorough provision of crucial information to ensure informed
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consent, including clearly stated terms and conditions, privacy
notices, and contributor agreements (in cases where data is to
be used by data aggregators that create open datasets). The
second underlying assumption is that, as it is currently the
case, no demographic data on the users of MobileMiner or
openPDS is collected and/or shared with third parties. Sharing
data such as age or gender with third parties might on the
one hand greatly increase the utility of the data provided. On
the other hand, it would however also increase the ease of
reidentifying individual users.
With regard to individual data classes, two aspects need
to be highlighted: First, MobileMiner generally collects time-
stamped location data, which could be used to distill unique
movement patterns [12]. However, location data collected by
MobileMiner is rather sparse. The app does not access GPS
or Googles location APIs, it only records data on the cell-
towers to which the phone was connected at a given time. This
undermines any efforts on cell-tower triangulation. Instead, it
only allows to locate individuals with a proximity of, at best,
a few hundred meters in urban spaces with a high cell-tower
density. In rural areas, this might easily be expanded to a
space of several hundred meters. Accordingly, MobileMiner
only allows to create very rough movement patterns. Mobile
phones can connect to a series of towers even while stationary,
clustering such a time-series of locations may yield a slight
increase in precision. We therefore assess that the location
data by MobileMiner data only creates low privacy risks. Re-
identifying individual users without substantial amounts of
external information about them appears to be rather difﬁcult
under these circumstances. Rather, in line with EDCs general
research interest, this data could be used to assess aggregate
movements of user groups. Second, the most invasive data
collected by MobileMiner is the smartphones wireless network
data. Here, the plain text of wireless networks which the
smartphone connects to could greatly increase privacy impacts.
If a phones regularly logs into a wireless network named
“TestSchool”, it is very likely that the owner of the smartphone
is either a pupil, teacher, or other member of school staff. This
again might allow an external attacker to identify additional
links which eventually help to identify a real person behind the
data. Certainly, the privacy impact of this data being accessible
largely depends on an external factor, i.e. the name of a
wireless network. However, to reduce potential privacy risks,
we should consider removing this class of data entirely from
the dataset or replacing wireless network names with a unique
identiﬁer.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The initial release of MobileMiner collected a ﬁxed set
of data classes, which were only made available to the user
if they were also transmitted to us. So far, the only users of
the application have been individuals closely involved with the
project known to us personally. From the client side, all that
is needed for a large scale release is ﬁne-grained control over
which data classes are transmitted, the obfuscation of wireless
network data and the embedding of clear terms and conditions
within the application. We shall demonstrate MobileMiner
interacting with an OpenPDS server via the Funf framework
and update our risk assessment in the light of this. For large-
scale adoption, OpenPDS will need to demonstrate in principal
that it can resist attempts at de-anonymisation with realistic
computational resources if queried as intended. It will also
need to be shown to be resistant to malicious requests in
practice.
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